Pakistan: To Talk or Not to Talk

India-Pakistan relations have been in cold storage for a considerable period, with no possibility of talks on the horizon. India maintains that Terror and Talks and Blood and Water cannot be mixed. However, there is a constituency within the country and abroad that favours some engagement between the two neighbours. India’s foremost analyst of Pakistan and the region, TCA Raghavan, discusses the issue in detail in an exclusive article for the Saviours.

A Renewed Debate

In recent weeks, the debate on whether India should engage with Pakistan or maintain a securitised stance has reignited, with Dattatreya Hosabale suggesting that engagement should be considered alongside security measures in response to terrorist attacks or provocations.  This shift from the government’s usual stance of ‘Talks and Terror cannot go together’ makes the debate particularly relevant for policy analysis.

The contours of the discussions that took place were largely on predictable lines. Those against the suggestion pointed to a long list of Pakistani perfidies- in the past quarter century itself, the list is quite impressive- Kargil, IC 814, the attacks on the Srinagar Assembly and the Parliament of India, the Suburban train attacks in Mumbai, the 26/11 attacks also in Mumbai and others. This chronology, it is argued, is embedded in a history of sustained diplomatic engagement through the period. So naturally, the question arises about the value of any engagement with Pakistan. In brief, according to this view, any objective reading of India-Pakistan history vindicates the proposition that ‘Talks and Terror cannot coexist’. This is quite apart from more fundamental forces that shape the India-Pakistan interface- the ideological difference in the way the respective states are constituted, the two-nation theory, Kashmir, etc.

The arguments from the other end are equally weighty (and this excludes those in favour of dialogue and engagement on the grounds of civilisational and cultural proximity and similarity). You cannot choose the neighbourhood that you inhabit. The absence of any engagement creates a situation in which conflicts can escalate dramatically. Limiting engagement with Pakistan to a narrow, securitised interface prevents you from bringing into play, in the India-Pakistan equation, your numerous other strengths and, in many ways, focuses the relationship onto a terrain that ultimately suits Pakistan more. The fact that the India-Pakistan adversarial equation has a nuclear weapons dimension is an often unstated but nevertheless vital ingredient in the argument that counsels restraint and engagement, if for no other reason than to reduce the likelihood of being drawn into escalatory situations with unpredictable consequences.

The Post 2016 Downturn and a ‘New Normal’

Since mid-2016- i.e. for about a decade now- the bilateral relationship is characterised by a sustained and sharp downturn- we have today a situation of a complete ban on trade, reduced and downgraded diplomatic representation, virtually zero social, sporting and cultural contacts with highly restricted visa policies and very little, if any, political or high-level diplomatic contacts. Alongside this, there is a toxic, highly charged political atmosphere in both countries regarding perceived acts of omission and commission by the other.

Of course, none of these factors, individually or collectively, is new in the India-Pakistan context. The adversarial contours of this relationship have long crystallised, and its low points have included wars, high-intensity conflicts just short of war, major terrorist attacks, corrosive strategic distrust and deeply ingrained mutual suspicions. This basic adversarial structure notwithstanding, the India-Pakistan trajectory has also been marked by crests and troughs from its earliest days.

The post-2016 downturn is therefore unusual and stands out for its longevity. In the past, downturns, even severe ones due to formal overt conflicts, have been of much shorter duration. A cyclical pattern in the relationship has therefore been more evident and has always periodically asserted itself. Many examples can be cited from the 1950s and, in fact, from every decade since.  But perhaps the most striking evidence for this comes from the chronology of the period immediately after May 1998, when both countries declared their nuclear weapon status. The high tensions of that time receded quickly with PM Vajpayee’s famous bus ‘yatra’ to Lahore in February 1999 and the announcement of an agreement by both sides committing to a composite dialogue process. By the summer of 1999, this crest had turned into a trough after cross-border intrusions were detected in Kargil, and an intense border war followed. The Kargil conflict and the hijacking of IC 814 were prominent and significant bilateral downturns, but by the summer of 2001, with the India-Pakistan summit at Agra, another crest seemed on the cards.

The point is that, in this historical context, the long, decade-long downturn since 2016 is unusual.

To many in India, this sustained downturn since 2016 feels like a new normal. The multiple failures of powerful Indian political and diplomatic initiatives to improve relations with Pakistan, the growing asymmetry between the two countries, and Pakistan’s visible descent into chaos and instability are among the factors that cement, for many, the conclusion that this is, in fact, the best way to deal with Pakistan. The new normal, therefore, represents a reduction of the political/ cultural/ diplomatic interface to the barest minimum, just short of revoking diplomatic relations, relying on kinetic measures to deter terrorism, and using your diplomatic heft to isolate Pakistan, since its obduracy and negative approach to India at the regional and international level is to be expected. The placing of the Indus Waters Treaty in abeyance is part of the same context of the new normal- to message Pakistan that no aspect of the bilateral interface can be insulated from the threat of terrorism.

The Present Context

The debate about ‘engagement or disengagement’ has a long provenance and, in many ways, is as integral to the India-Pakistan landscape as any other structural feature of the relationship. There is, nevertheless, a novel feature of the present context which stands out. If we take a two-decade-long perspective, we find it neatly divided into almost equal halves, with contrasting policy regimes in India vis-à-vis Pakistan.

A strong commitment to engagement characterises the period from 2004 to 2016 (Table 1), and this policy is persisted with notwithstanding major provocations from time to time in the form of debilitating terrorist attacks.   

What underwrote this phase of sustained engagement is also well known. There was, first and foremost, an assessment in India that, after the nuclearisation of the subcontinent, a constituency for peace had emerged in Pakistan, and that deft and patient diplomacy could consolidate it.

Secondly, this phase, covering the first decade and a half of the new century and the new millennium, largely coincided with the Global War on Terror and the major US and multinational presence in Afghanistan, with all its attendant consequences for Pakistan-India relations. In India, this coincidence also suggested that diplomatic pressures could be mobilised by way of support from the international community and applied to Pakistan to make it take action against terrorist groups operating from within its territory.

Thirdly, and finally, there was a sense of confidence and expectation that the growing economic asymmetry between the two countries would encourage stakeholders in Pakistan to think more rationally and positively about their future as a neighbour of India.

The period saw innovative diplomacy leading to breakthroughs, such as agreements on cross-LOC trade and travel – effectively breaking a logjam in J and K that had been in place since 1948. There was also healthy growth in bilateral trade, significant expansion in people-to-people contacts, and sustained, regular, high-level political contact and dialogue, which held out the hope of a durable, long-term agreement on peaceful coexistence and the management of differences.

At the same time, progress on the larger agenda appeared less than impressive in terms of major terrorist attacks continuing and the Pakistani response being evasive and at best legalistic- in a word, disappointing. Not very surprisingly, therefore, this phase of positive and creative diplomacy marked otherwise by many positive outcomes and major investment of political capital in the India-Pakistan dialogue process, ended amidst terrorist attacks and the consolidation of the view in India that the best way of dealing with these was robust kinetic responses. Public support in India for an engagement process with Pakistan rapidly depleted. By the time this phase ended in mid-2016, few in India mourned the end of a long period of purposeful engagement with Pakistan.     

The situation post-2016 stands in stark contrast to the earlier decade, with a sharp, significant downward trend in bilateral relations. Unlike the wave-like or oscillating pattern of the past- like a sine curve on a graph- India-Pakistan relations in the decade since 2016 have resembled a flat line or a graph showing a plateau at a low level but with a further downward plunge around mid 2025.

It is evident that the relationship has progressively hollowed out since 2016. By the time of the Pahalgam terrorist attack this had become in fact a near zero relationship with no High Commissioners in place; a total absence of high-level contacts, diplomatic relations downgraded and respective high commissions sized down, a ban on trade, a freeze on civil society, cultural and sporting contacts, a ban on trade, a shutdown of all usual modes of travel such as bus, train etc. A widespread sentiment in India, accompanying this disengagement, held that this was the best policy for dealing with such a recalcitrant neighbour.

What strengthened this approach was the fact that from 2018 onwards, and aggravating during the pandemic and later, saw a convergence of otherwise unrelated crisis vectors domestically within Pakistan – a severe economic downturn, a balance of payments crisis, severe – perhaps optically the most dramatic Pakistan has seen- civil military clashes, a serious downturn in internal security, an embarrassing breakdown in relations with the Taliban in Afghanistan post August 2021, amongst others- which led to these years being termed Pakistan’s poly crisis phase. This was also a period in which Pakistan’s relations with the US were unusually strained, implying also a further psychological burden quite apart from all the material consequences of this downturn. In parallel, there was a sense that relations with the GCC states, so vital to Pakistan, had also lacked energy at this time. In contrast, India’s relations with each of them had diversified and consolidated.

In brief, India’s policy of complete disengagement also seemed to align with a broader process of Pakistan’s international isolation. This further reinforced the view in India that Pakistan was becoming geopolitically irrelevant. In Pakistan itself, morale plunged amidst the intersection of different crisis vectors referred to above.    

The details of the outrageous terrorist attack in Pahalgam and the subsequent sequence of events are well known and do not require recapitulation. Some refer to the period from 7th to 10th May as constituting the 5th India-Pakistan War – the shortest of the four wars (1947-48, 1965, 1971, and Kargil), yet of sufficient intensity to qualify as a ‘war’. However it is termed, the May June 2025 crisis was certainly the most significant of the past quarter-century.

The messages that have been sent to Pakistan by way of Op Sindoor are also clear enough– terrorist attacks will carry major price tags, and no aspect of the India-Pakistan relationship can be considered insulated from the costs to be paid. That targets were struck deep inside Pakistan underscores this point. In some accounts, this Indian approach amounts to further consolidating the ‘New Normal’.

The suspension of the Indus Waters Treaty is possibly the strongest diplomatic sanction ever imposed by India against Pakistan. That this instrument was used says something about the extent of the horror that the Pahalgam massacre catalysed in the Indian mind. But equally, it reflects the state of the India-Pakistan relationship since 2016, with no diplomatic or political contacts, zero trade, and no bilateral dealings.

Three Key Factors for the Current Trend

Notwithstanding the strength and clarity of these messages, both military/kinetic and diplomatic/political periods since mid-2025 have shown an unexpected trend. Three very obvious factors make for this new trend.

The first is a feel-good boost cutting across party lines and a cross-section of public opinion in Pakistan, flowing directly from the success of the narrative that the country effectively countered and stood up to India, both militarily and diplomatically, during the April-May 2025 India-Pakistan crisis and through Op Sindoor. Amongst the consequences of this is a visible strengthening of the military’s position, the repair of its significantly dented image, and, finally, the consolidation of the hybrid government currently led by PM Shahbaz Sharif and the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz).

The second factor is a very visible improvement in relations with the United States, correcting a long-standing downswing since 2018, which was further accentuated after the US withdrawal from Afghanistan in disarray in August 2021. That downturn has reversed itself dramatically, with strong chemistry at the leadership level and a quantifiable improvement in US-Pakistan relations. Amongst the many consequences of this is an important subjective factor- the psychological burden imposed by a difficult phase in US-Pakistan relations has eased.

The third factor derives directly from Pakistan’s astonishing -and, to many, unlikely- emergence as an effective mediator and interlocuter in the Iran-US conflict since the end of March 2026. The consequences of this are also straightforward. This has strengthened the feel-good factor, referred to earlier domestically within Pakistan. Secondly, it has boosted Pakistan’s external image as a geopolitically responsible player, which in turn feeds into domestic discourse and narratives.  

Assessing Two Distinct Phases in India-Pakistan Relations

Clearly, each of these two distinct phases has produced mixed results, and neither approach has been entirely successful in yielding outcomes that either substantially change or reduce the challenge Pakistan poses to our external policy. Insofar as one can discern, the principal difference between these two phases is the extent of domestic political traction that each distinct policy approach has been able to garner. At its height, the engagement phase also had a fair measure of popular sentiment behind it. That support, however, gradually withered away in the face of continued terrorist attacks from Pakistan, and continued engagement and diplomacy were increasingly seen as a weak and tepid response to such provocations. In contrast, disengagement and the application of kinetic force have, insofar as can be determined, strong and visible political support. The internal consistency and simplicity of the position “Talks and Terror Cannot go Together” have a compelling quality in public and political opinion.           

The point, however, is that neighbourhood situations are inherently dynamic, and in any of them it is unrealistic to expect a stable, static situation for a prolonged period. Each country-specific toolkit, therefore, requires constant modification, updating and even overhaul. At the same time, notwithstanding every effort to establish a balanced and appropriate policy, situations will inevitably arise that defy quick resolution, and bilateral relations will come under strain.

If these general considerations apply to all bilateral relationships in South Asia involving India, they apply with even greater force to Pakistan. Assessing the optimal policy cocktail for the future, therefore, means being conscious of the nature of neighbourhood complexities. Expectations of a final resolution of all disputes and a consistently stable relationship thereafter are unrealistic. Realism demands seeking interim, even temporary, improvisations and carefully constructed regimens of stability, without being blind to their temporal nature. There is then no alternative to the hard, constant, and sometimes boring grind of diplomacy.

Conclusion

A successful diplomatic and foreign policy toolkit would obviously have the weight of public opinion behind it, but public support or approbation cannot, in itself, be a critical factor in judging the efficacy and effectiveness of such a policy. Given the basic adversarial structure of the India-Pakistan relationship, it also means accepting that military and kinetic measures will not, in any realistic sense, create new political options or radically alter the existing status quo. This means that an optimal policy must combine different national strengths.

A narrow-securitised interface becomes, in its thrust, a tactical rather than a longer-term policy. The latter necessarily suggests that a measure of engagement with Pakistan- and yes, that means to talk- is also vital, and the domestic consequences of this on public opinion and domestic politics will also have to be managed and contained. An optimal outcome in the India-Pakistan context means a minimum agreement rather than a grand ‘once and for all’ bargain, which is both unrealistic and difficult to sustain. Accepting and understanding optimal approaches rather than setting the bar unrealistically high for perfect outcomes is part of the package when it comes to neighbourhood relationships. Success has accordingly to be redefined as relatively greater stability for finite periods of time rather than a solution of all problems for all times to come. Such an approach requires sagacity and bandwidth to craft and, in addition, a great deal of political capital and courage to implement.