CRPF is in the line of fire – literally and figuratively. Its officers and men are engaged in a bitter battle with the Naxals in the Red Corridor carved out in the forested areas of a dozen states affecting over a hundred districts.
Being a specialized and the most experienced force in the country in dealing with the Naxal scourge, its members are naturally deployed in the worst affected areas considered strongholds of the outlawed organization in the states of Chattisgarh, Jharkhand, Orissa, and Bihar. Every day is a day of judgment for the troops that go out on a patrol in the jungles without any guarantee of safe return. They are in the line of fire from the Naxals who are inhabitants of that area and are quite adept in guerilla warfare.
The violence levels in the LWE areas have come down significantly but a few successful strikes here and there, bring the CRPF Bravehearts into another line of fire from the security experts, defense analysts, intelligentsia, academia, and veterans who lose no time in picking holes in the strategy, HR practices, deployment and execution without ever thinking about the morale of the officers and men who go out to perform in the same area the very next day without having much knowledge about the terrain and grimness of the situation where their brethren had shed their blood hours ago. It has also become fashionable to settle private scores through media columns by raising inter-services rivalry, mostly out of context. The silence of human rights activists and those who champion the cause of tribal rights and democratic values is disturbing, to say the least over these killings by the ultras.
It needs to be known to the readers that Naxal violence has been managed quite effectively by CRPF and sister central and state armed police forces and the city police over the years. The role of local level and central intelligence agencies has also been praiseworthy. No gainsaying that there is scope for improvement in this effort. The security forces accounted for 222 LWE cadres in 2016 compared to 89 in 2015. In the first two months of this year, 50 LWEs have been neutralized in the police action. Fatalities of security force personnel have also reduced drastically from 2007 onwards. In the last two years, the figure has hovered around sixty. March and April this year have been cruel to CRPF personnel in which 37 troops have been martyred in two separate gruesome incidents. Incidentally, this is the period when CRPF remained headless.
2017 is going to be a tough year for the forces deployed in the LWE-affected states for this year the Maoists are observing 50 years of their movement and have vowed to regroup themselves and come hard at the security forces and suspected police informers. The figures of civilians killed at the hands of Maoists have shown an upward trend. In 2016, more than 200 civilians mostly on the suspicion of being informers were butchered by the Naxals. The figures may be unfortunate but point to a positive trend of the local population’s willingness to report the Naxal movement and oppression. More and more people want access to developmental schemes, education, and health services, which have long been denied to them because of the kangaroo rule of the Maoists in the tribal hinterland. Both the unfortunate incidents that have taken place in the last two months have occurred in the Sukma district which is considered the last bastion of the Naxals in the state. Construction of roads will surely make the whole region accessible to development and security forces which will weaken the stranglehold of the ultras in the rural areas as well. Resistance to this road project in Sukma is central to both sides for different reasons. The Maoists do not want the road which will adversely impact their writ in the region whereas the road is vital for the state to break the back of the militant outfit to usher in an era of development and resultant peace in the region. It is quite paradoxical that the Maoists who militate against the state on the ground of governmental apathy and indifference to the common man, pose the biggest hurdle to developmental activities in the region. Their mentors have also shown a conspicuous lack of an implementable roadmap for the development of the tribal populations except for reinforcing vendetta and overthrowing the democratically elected government. And what were this slain CRPF personnel doing? They were merely providing protection to the labor engaged in the task of building a vital road link for the tribals giving them access to development and modern amenities!
Over 100 battalions of paramilitary forces particularly CRPF are deployed in the LWE-affected states. COBRA battalions which can operate independently for a few days at a stretch are also deployed in the region. Contrary to some uninformed comments in a section of the media, CRPF has a robust HR practice for the LWE areas. No one above 35 years of age is inducted in COBRA units and sustained pre-induction training is mandatory for all troops and battalions assigned to LWE duties. These units are backed by the unit-level dedicated intelligence teams, local police, and central agencies. The battalions and higher formations are led by highly motivated officers who have proved their mettle over the years in similar situations. In spite of all this, the adversary is sometimes able to breach our defenses, be it in the Naxal areas or near the LoC. Yes, there is a case for increasing the number of COBRA battalions and a separate dedicated central armed police force (CAPF) to deal with the Red menace which this writer does not see withering away in a hurry. Also, there is merit in the argument that a stronger intelligence network needs to be established through local participation. So far as the firepower is concerned, the Maoists are no match to the CAPFs. The only element that goes in favor of the Maoists is the element of surprise and use of IEDs. The aggressor will always have the benefit of surprise and initiative and the state forces can never use IEDs against their own people. The CAPFs also do not have the protection of a statute like AFSPA. The limitations of the CAPFs should not be lost on some of the commentators deriding the training, HR practices, deployment, and operational acumen of the men in khaki. It may be reminded that the only state in the country which was successfully brought back to normalcy after bloody militancy was Punjab and credit for it lies with our police forces.
There is absolutely no doubt that whenever an army unit is attacked by a handful of militants from across the border or a company-level patrol is waylaid by the Naxal militia numbering in hundreds, the commanding officers can be hauled up for breach of security protocol and drills. I suppose it is part of the package. We have to take it on the chin and move on. Abundant caution needs to be exercised before commenting on such incidents because incomplete knowledge of the facts and pitting one force against the other can play havoc with the morale of the force and inter-departmental synergy and the overall security scenario of the country.
